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ABSTRACT
Many features of living wage laws may influence the strength of their effects on wages and
employment of low-skill individuals. Echoing past research, business assistance living wage laws
generate stronger wage increases and employment reductions than contractor-only laws. But broader
enforcement or implementation and geographic concentration of living wage laws also appear to
strengthen their effects. Finally, geographic concentration may be more significant than the







Public Policy Institute of California
500 Washington St, Suite 800





Living wage laws have become almost commonplace in cities across the United States.  The total 
number of living wage laws now in effect in the United States—mostly in cities but some in other 
jurisdictions—is near 100.
1  Studying the effects of living wage laws at the city level, our research to date 
(Neumark and Adams, 2003a and 2003b) has found that the most typical living wage laws that apply only 
to city contractors do not have detectable effects on wages or employment of low-skill individuals, nor on 
poverty rates, which is perhaps not surprising given the relatively low estimates of coverage of city 
contractors that other researchers have reported (see Table 1 in Neumark and Adams, 2003a).  In contrast, 
it is only for the broader living wage laws that apply also to employers receiving business assistance from 
the city that we detect any statistically significant effects.  These “business assistance laws” include those 
laws that cover firms receiving financial assistance, tax abatements, grants, low interest loans, or other 
forms of government assistance from cities, and result in higher wages, lower employment, and net poverty 
reductions.  Our most up-to-date evidence using data through 2002 (Adams and Neumark, forthcoming) 
finds that for these broader living wage laws, for the bottom decile of the wage or skill distribution, the 
wage elasticity with respect to the mandated living wage is about 0.07 and the employment elasticity is 
about −0.12.  The elasticity of the overall poverty rate is about −0.19.
2
Although our research has found robust evidence of different effects of contractor-only and 
business assistance living wage laws, it has not provided a satisfactory explanation of the differences.  We 
have conjectured that the economic effects of business assistance living wage laws may differ from those of 
contractor-only laws.  In particular, contractor-only laws typically require that employers pay the mandated 
wage only for work done as part of the contract, allowing employers to mitigate the costs of complying 
with living wage laws by reallocating their higher wage labor to the contract work and their lower wage 
labor to noncontract work, and even reducing wages on noncontract work.  But there may be fewer avenues 
for mitigating the costs (and therefore the effects) of living wage laws for employers covered under 
business assistance provisions.  An establishment created with the help of business assistance from a city 
would appear to have no choice but to pay all employees no less than the mandated living wage for all of  
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their work.  And while contractors can reduce the share of their business with the city in response to a 
living wage (and, similarly, cities can shift business to higher-wage employers), business assistance 
recipients may have less leeway as they may have accepted long-term benefits, such as bond financing or 
tax relief, in return for locating in the jurisdiction.  In some cases at least, relocation costs seem likely to far 
outweigh costs from shifting business away from city contracts.  Yet these explanations are just 
conjectures.   
Moreover, our evidence that business assistance living wage laws have significant effects (and 
much stronger effects than contractor-only living wage laws) has been viewed skeptically by both 
researchers (e.g., Brenner, et al., 2002) and more importantly those directly involved with living wage 
campaigns and living wage implementation, who believe that business assistance living wages laws are in 
fact a very weak tool, barely increasing the share of workers covered by the contractor provisions of living 
wage laws, and weakly enforced.   
In our view, the strongest and most substantive alternative explanation of our findings that has been 
offered is that business assistance living wage laws are not fundamentally different or stronger in terms of 
the underlying economics or the share of workers affected.  Rather, the broader business assistance living 
wage laws may have arisen in cities where a constellation of forces—often related to the dynamics of living 
wage campaigns—have resulted in stronger living wage laws generally, and perhaps more importantly 
stronger implementation and enforcement because of both how the cities oversee the laws and how much 
community and other groups remain engaged.   
These concerns have led us, in this paper, to explore the effects of living wage laws in a framework 
that attempts to account for the wide variety of living wage laws.  Aside from contactor-only versus 
business assistance provisions, living wage laws also differ in terms of factors like the extent of coverage 
specified, the employers or workers exempted, enforcement and implementation, provisions for community 
hiring or labor peace agreements, and whether living wage laws exist in nearby jurisdictions that might 
amplify their effects.  Our analysis addresses both a narrow and a broad question.  The narrow question is 
whether the contractor-only versus business assistance distinction is the core distinction, or whether instead  
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variation in this distinction is associated with other features of living wage laws that are the ones that really 
matter.  The broad question is how the many different features of living wage laws influence the effects 
these laws have on urban labor markets.  In particular, in this paper we try to identify those characteristics 
of living wage laws that are most strongly associated with wage and employment effects. 
Three qualifications or limitations should be noted at the outset.  First, there are not a great many 
observations on cities with different types of living wage laws from which to draw strong statistical 
inferences.  Living wage laws have only been around since the mid-1990s, and although they have grown 
to cover a large number of cities, much of this growth occurred in the last few years, and we can only draw 
reliable inferences for those cities large enough to provide a reasonable number of observations in national 
labor market surveys.  So especially when we try to take account of a variety of dimensions of living wage 
laws, statistical power becomes somewhat tenuous and much of our evidence can be viewed as suggestive 
only.  Second, our analysis takes place at the city level, focusing on the net effects of living wage laws on 
low-wage or low-skill workers.  The city-level analysis estimates the effects of alternative policies, treating 
those policies to some extent as black boxes—although the consideration of varieties of living wage laws 
and their provisions is intended to help illuminate what goes on inside the black box.  Future work needs to 
augment such city-level analyses with research on the effects of living wages at the firm or establishment 
level that try to test alternative hypotheses about the effects of different types of living wage laws.  And 
third, there may be features of living wage campaigns that are not reflected in either the laws that result or 
the observable features of enforcement, but which influence labor market outcomes in their aftermath; an 
example is changed norms of behavior affecting wage setting.  To some extent, these unmeasured 
influences may be common to all cities with living wage laws, and hence be captured in the estimated 
effects.  But to the extent that they differ across cities, they remain an omitted source of variation in our 
empirical analysis. 
II. Features of Living Wage Laws 
Table 1 presents a summary of information on living wage laws that is used in the empirical 
analysis.
3  The table is divided into cities with contractor-only laws, those with contractor as well as  
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business assistance provisions, and the few cities with business assistance provisions but without contractor 
coverage.  There are a few important features or provisions of living wage laws that are not directly 
displayed in the table.  First, the range of living wages is quite large, with living wages quite high in some 
cities.  Current levels of living wages for these cities range from a low of $6.50 in Duluth to a high of 
$10.86 in New Haven.
4  Second, living wages are a recent phenomenon; the earliest living wage (in 
Baltimore) was implemented in 1995, and many of the living wage laws covered were implemented in the 
last few years.  And finally, living wage laws are geographically quite dispersed, over-represented in 
higher-wage and higher-cost parts of the country, but also present in the Midwest, parts of the South, and in 
some medium-sized cities.   
Column (2) of Table 1 summarizes coverage of contractors under each city’s living wage law.  This 
coverage varies in terms of the minimum contract covered, the types of contractors covered, and other 
features, and is classified as narrow or broad relative to most cities.  For example, Portland’s living wage 
law applies only to custodial, security, and parking attendants, and is therefore classified as “narrow,” while 
the laws in Los Angeles and Oakland cover some leaseholders (and in the case of Oakland the port), and 
are therefore classified as “broad.”
5   
The next two columns of the table provide descriptions of the business assistance recipients 
covered.  Three of the cities with business assistance living wage laws are coded as having narrow 
assistance coverage.  As an example, San Jose is coded this way because its law only applies to recipients 
of direct financial assistance, and excludes forms of assistance that in other cities trigger coverage.  One 
important feature of business assistance living wage laws that was suggested to us by a prominent living 
wage organizer is whether tenants or leaseholders are covered.
6  For example, if a shopping mall is built 
with financial assistance that makes the developer and builder covered, then a leaseholder provision implies 
that the employees of the establishments that eventually occupy the mall will also be covered, which should 
substantially increase the impact of the living wage law.  Additional provisions of living wage laws are 
covered in columns (5)-(7).  These include community hiring provisions, labor peace or no strike 
agreements, and whether the living wage is superseded by collective bargaining agreements.
7    
5 
As noted in the introduction, one of the central hypotheses we consider is that the key 
distinguishing feature of living wage laws is their enforcement and implementation.  We examined details 
regarding living wage enforcement, including reporting requirements, penalties for violations, etc.  These 
do not differ greatly across cities, and in addition, of course, what enforcement mechanisms are specified 
and what is actually done may differ.  In column (8), therefore, we instead report information from research 
by Luce (forthcoming) that categorizes enforcement/implementation efforts by city based on a survey of 
living wage laws and city staff, as well as auxiliary information.  Briefly, Luce classifies a city as having 
“broad” enforcement/implementation when there is at least “one full-time person assigned to oversee 
ordinance administration, who can answer questions about the law and who can be held accountable for 
problems” and the “staff actively monitors the ordinance by reviewing payroll records and inspecting 
worksites” (p. 96).  In these cases, according to Luce, staff are engaged in trying to improve the ordinance, 
creating benchmarks, and making information public.  In contrast, she classifies cities without full-time 
staff, in which it is difficult to find someone to answer questions, and where cities do the minimum to fulfill 
technical requirements, as having “narrow” enforcement/implementation.  She also classifies some 
intermediate cases as “medium.”  Based on Luce’s discussion of how and why implementation and 
enforcement differ across cities, we believe that her classification helps to capture differences that arise 
from the dynamics of living wage campaigns and the efforts of community and other groups to remain 
engaged.  This classification of living wage enforcement/implementation as “narrow,” “medium,” or 
“broad” in column (8) of Table 1 is taken directly from Luce’s Table 5.2.
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Finally, columns (9) and (10) of Table 1 record whether the city living wage law is also in a county 
with a living wage law, as well as whether there are one or more nearby cities with living wage laws.  In 
both cases the year in which a nearby living wage was first implemented is noted; this variation in timing is 
also used in the empirical analysis.
9  Both of these characteristics of living wage laws are meant to capture 
whether a city’s living wage law is likely to have its effect amplified by the presence of nearby living wage 
laws.  Part of the importance of this distinction arises from the nature of the data.  In particular, we use 
Current Population Survey data that classify people by where they live, not where they work.  Thus, any  
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effect of living wage laws is likely to be amplified when there are nearby living wage laws, simply because 
more workers in the particular city are in fact covered by a living wage law.  But nearby living wage laws 
may also amplify the effects of any city’s living wage law because of the underlying economics, and we 
suspect this is the more important phenomenon.  For example, consider an employer who has business with 
multiple cities; given the nature of businesses that typically do business with a city, this is likely.  If a small 
share of the business is covered by a living wage law, because only one of the cities with which the 
employer has contracts is covered, then there will be more scope for mitigating the effects of a living wage 
law.  But if nearby cities have living wage laws, more of the employer’s work is likely to be covered by 
such laws and therefore the employer would have less scope for reducing wages on other work done by its 
employees, less scope for shifting high-wage workers to the covered contract, and also less scope for 
shifting business away from the city that imposes the living wage law.  Finally, the fact that nearby cities 
have a living wage ordinance may be a sign that a broader living wage movement took place in the area, 
perhaps resulting in greater attention paid to the laws by both businesses and government. 
The parsimonious descriptions of living wage laws provided in Table 1 are useful in giving an 
impression of how contractor-only and business assistance living wage laws differ along other dimensions, 
which is useful in highlighting the other characteristics of living wage laws that might explain the 
differences between these two broad categories of laws.  Table 1 suggests that on some dimensions, 
contractor-only and business assistance laws do not look very different.  For example, roughly equal shares 
are in counties with their own living wage laws, and the shares with provisions for supersession by 
collective bargaining are similar.  However, business assistance laws are considerably more likely to be in 
cities for which nearby cities also have living wage laws, and in cities with community hiring provisions.  
With regard to enforcement/implementation, the differences do not appear sharp, although more of the 
contractor-only living wage laws are classified as having weak enforcement/implementation.   
The empirical analysis described in the next two sections explores how the wage and employment 
effects of living wage laws vary with these different features or provisions of living wage laws, and asks 
whether this variation helps to explain evidence that business assistance living wage laws appear to have  
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much stronger effects.  Note that a few of the features of living wage laws listed in Table 1 apply only to 
business assistance living wage laws (assistance coverage, leaseholder coverage, and labor peace 
agreements).  While these differences therefore cannot explain differences relative to contractor-only living 
wage laws, they can help us examine which features of business assistance living wage laws mute or 
amplify their effects, and given prior expectations of the directions of these effects, such results can provide 
additional evidence on whether the estimated effects of business assistance living wage laws are real or 
spurious. 
III. Empirical Approach 
Data 
The data on wages, employment, and other worker-related characteristics come from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) monthly Outgoing Rotation Group files (ORGs) extending from January 1996 
through December 2002.  The ORG files are preferable to the March Annual Demographic files for the 
analysis of wages and employment because they have information on current wages and provide a sample 
three times as large.  Because cities cannot be identified in the ORG files for a period in 1995, coupled with 
the fact that most living wage laws came into effect in 1996 or after, we restricted the sample to begin in 
1996.
10   
In these files, residents of all MSAs, encompassing all large- and medium-sized cities in the United 
States, can be identified.  We extracted data on these residents for our empirical analysis.  In some respects, 
we would like to know where people work rather than where they live, but such information is not 
available, and employees of firms covered by living wage laws need not work in the MSA.  The 
correspondence between cities and MSAs is imperfect, but because many suburban residents work in the 
city, this is not necessarily inappropriate; for ease of exposition we often refer to cities instead of MSAs.
11  
The CPS has some disadvantages and some advantages for studying the effects of living wages.  
Given that the CPS is a household-based survey with virtually no information on employers, it is not 
possible to identify covered and uncovered workers.  Instead, all we can identify (and therefore the only 
information we exploit in the empirical analysis) is the city in which a worker lives and the type of law  
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prevailing there.  Obviously, then, CPS data are not useful in exploring the microeconomic effects of living 
wages at the firm or establishment level (i.e., questions such as whether firms engage in substitution away 
from low-wage labor, how much wages are increased for their lowest-wage workers, how employment 
responds, whether turnover falls, etc.).  Such questions are best addressed using direct survey data on 
covered employers and ideally a control group of uncovered or unaffected employers, as has begun to occur 
in some recent research on living wages (e.g., Brenner, this issue; Fairris, this issue), although not with 
respect to studying the effects of different types of living wage laws.  On the other hand, the CPS data are 
the best data available for addressing the overall effects of living wage policies on low-wage workers, 
because they permit us to estimate the net effects, including indirect or perhaps “general equilibrium” 
effects, of such laws in the cities where they are passed, relative to other cities.  Ultimately, though, the two 
types of data and research are complementary and can inform each other, with firm-level data allowing 
researchers to test propositions about the individual-level behavioral responses of employers and workers to 
the imposition of living wages and city-level data allowing researchers to assess the overall policy 
consequences.
12   
Estimating Wage and Employment Effects 
  For wages, our basic strategy is to estimate a wage equation for the low-wage workers on whom 
living wages are most likely to have an impact; we focus in particular on workers who fall below the 10
th 
centile in any given city-month cell.
13  Considering initially, for simplicity, the case where there is a single 












           ( 1 )  
                           + δYYt + δMMs + δCCj + θ·T + θLW·T·LWjs + εijst.        
 
In this specification w
p is the hourly wage for individuals in the specified range (p) of the wage 
distribution, in this case below the 10
th centile.  The subscripts ‘i’, ‘j’, ‘s’, and ‘t’ denote individual, city, 
month, and year.  ε is a random error term.  X is a vector of individual characteristics (age, sex, race,  
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education, and marital status),
14 w
min is the higher of the federal or state minimum wage,
15 and w
liv is the 
higher of the living wage or the minimum wage.  Y, M, and C are vectors of year, month, and city (MSA) 
dummy variables.
16  T is a linear time trend.  LWjs is an indicator for cities that adopt a living wage law at 
any time during the sample period and has only a ‘js’ subscript to indicate that it is zero or one for the 
entire sample period.   
The living wage variable that multiplies γ is specified as the maximum of the (logs of the) living 
wage and the minimum wage.  We control for minimum wages separately because many cities with living 
wages are in states with high minimum wages, and we want to estimate the independent effects of living 
wages.  This specification of the living wage effect, coupled with the inclusion of the minimum wage, 
imposes the minimum as the wage floor in the absence of a living wage.  However, because living wages 
may have effects different from minimum wages, the coefficient is allowed to differ from that of the 
standard minimum wage floor.
17  If living wages boost the wages of low-wage workers, we would expect to 
find positive estimates of γ when we are looking at workers at the bottom of the wage distribution.  In the 
specifications we estimate, we lag ln(w
min) and ln(w
liv) by 12 months to allow for slower, adaptive 
responses to changes in minimum wages and living wages.  In our earlier work we never found much 
evidence of contemporaneous effects of living wages or effects at shorter lags, presumably in part because 
the effects of the laws accumulate as contracts are renewed each year.
18   
It is important to clarify the interpretation of equation (1).  As the preceding discussion makes 
clear, we are estimating the equation for those with wages below a given threshold.  The selection on those 
below a given threshold is not problematic as long as we interpret the regression as estimating effects on a 
conditional mean.  Note also that even if living wages tend to be above the 10
th centile of the wage 
distribution, if the laws raise wages of some workers initially below the 10
th centile to above the 10
th 
centile, then the average wage of workers below the 10
th centile will clearly increase.
19  And, similarly, if 
some workers drop below the 10
th centile, then the average wage below the 10
th centile has to have fallen, 





We use the same basic empirical framework to study employment, with only two differences.  
First, we estimate linear probability models for individual employment status.  Second, we cannot classify 
non-working individuals based on their position in the wage distribution.  Instead, we impute wages for 
everyone and group individuals based on their position in the distribution of imputed wages, or “skills.”
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The year and month dummy variables control for common changes across cities in the sample that 
could otherwise be confounded with living wage effects, because living wages were typically enacted later 
in the sample period.  The city dummy variables control for the possibility that living wage laws were 
passed in cities with either particularly high or low wages, which would again confound the estimation of 
their effects.  Thus, equation (1) identifies an effect of the living wage when the dependent variable 
changes differentially in cities that pass living wage laws (or increase their living wage) relative to cities 
that did not pass living wage laws—a difference-in-differences research design. 
The difference-in-differences strategy is predicated on the assumption that absent the living wage 
and aside from differences captured in the other control variables, the treatment and control groups are 
comparable.  Note, though, that explicit controls for local labor market conditions are not included.  
Although local labor market conditions can surely matter, they are also potentially endogenous if, for 
example, living wages cause some job loss.  Fixed differences in economic conditions between the 
treatment and control groups are captured in the city dummy variables, and the year and month dummy 
variables capture changes in economic conditions common to all cities.  However, a potential problem 
arises if economic conditions are changing differentially by location.  For this reason, to capture some 
dimensions of differing changes in economic conditions across cities, equation (1) also includes differential 
linear time trends for cities that did and did not pass living wage laws over the sample period.  The 
difference in the trend for cities passing living wage laws is captured in the term θLW·T·LWjs.  Although 
these trends do not capture every possible variation in local economic conditions, they will capture 
systematic differences between the different groups of cities in the rates of change of wages (and 
employment). 
For cities that had very few observations for a given month, determining whether a worker fell in a  
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particular range of the distribution is unreliable.  We therefore restrict our sample for each analysis to 
workers in city-month cells with at least 25 observations (although most have far more observations).  All 
observations on MSA-month pairs identified in the CPS and meeting the sample size restrictions are 
included in the analysis. 
Estimating the Effects of Different Features of Living Wage Laws 
The key issue that this paper explores is how the effects of living wage laws differ depending on 
the features or provisions of living wage laws.  This analysis proceeds in four steps.  First, we consider 
dichotomous distinctions between living wage laws: e.g., contractor-only versus business assistance laws,
22 
living wage laws that are coupled with those in nearby cities versus those that are not, etc.  We estimate the 
separate effects using specifications of the form 
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           ( 2 )  
                           + δYYt + δMMs + δCCj + θ·T + θ1,LW·T·LWjs·L1 + θ2,LW·T·LWjs·L2 + εijst.      
 
 
What is different in this specification is the interactions with L1 and L2, which are dummy variables 
for the two different types of living wage laws under consideration.
23  First, we add a second variable with 
the max of the logs of the living and minimum wages, in each case interacting the living wage variables 
with these two dummy variables; the interaction occurs inside the max operator so that in the absence of a 
living wage the floor is the minimum wage, for reasons discussed earlier.  The parameters γ1 and γ2 then 
capture the differences in the effects of wage floors generated by living wages, allowing these to differ 
depending on the type of living wage law.  Second, we add a separate interaction between the time trend 
and the indicator for passage of a living wage law; each of these is interacted with L1 and L2, which allows 
the cities with different types of living wage laws to have different underlying trends, for the reasons 
outlined above.
24   
The second step in the analysis addresses more directly the question of whether the differences we 
have found in past research between the effects of business assistance and contractor-only laws might in  
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fact be explained by other features of living wage laws that are either more or less frequently associated 
with business assistance living wage laws.  To do this, we use a version of equation (2), but we augment it 
to consider three types of living wage laws.  Paralleling L1 and L2 in equation (2), we include indicators—
LB and LC—and the associated interactions for contractor-only living wage laws and business assistance 
living wage laws; as in equation (2), these classifications of living wage laws are mutually exclusive.  In 
addition, though, we include an indicator and the corresponding interactions for another provision of living 
wage laws, such as whether there is a county law.  Calling the indicator of such provisions LP, what is 
different is that LP can be equal to one when either LB or LC is equal to one.  Then equation (2) is 
augmented as 
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jst)]+ δYYt + δMMs + δCCj + θ·T  
 + θC,LW·T·LWjs·LC + θB,LW·T·LWjs·LB + θP,LW·T·LWjs·LP + εijst.      
 
This specification lets us ask—continuing with the county living wage law example—whether the 
effects of business assistance living wage laws continue to look different from the effects of contractor-only 
living wage laws even after we allow for different effects of living wage laws based on whether or not there 
is a county living wage law.  Note also that, as in equation (2), a separate trend has been added for cities 
whose living wage laws include the particular provision under consideration. 
The preceding analysis tells us whether allowing living wage laws with some particular feature 
(such as an accompanying county living wage) results in a finding that contractor-only and business 
assistance living wage laws no longer look so different, and instead that the important difference is between 
those living wage laws accompanied and not accompanied by county living wages.  Such a finding would 
suggest that the earlier evidence on differences between contractor-only and business assistance living 
wage laws actually reflected the fact that these two types of laws were differentially accompanied by 
county living wages.  Note that while the implication of this finding would be that the key difference  
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between living wage laws is whether or not there is also a county living wage, it is possible that business 
assistance living wage laws still have detectable effects.   
Moreover, the effects of business assistance living wage laws may for some reasons be 
considerably stronger when coupled with a county living wage.  Our third analysis explores this question 
by expanding the specification to allow the differential in the effects of business assistance versus 
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  + δYYt + δMMs + δCCj + θ·T + θB,LW·T·LWjs·LB + θC,LW·T·LWjs·LC          
  + θP,LW·T·LWjs·LP + θBxP,LW’·T·LWjs·LB·LP + εijst.      
 
Note that, paralleling the earlier specifications, equation (4) allows for different underlying trends for each 
group of cities categorized by type of living wage law and provision.
25   
The description of equation (4) pertains to provisions that can apply to either contractor-only or 
business assistance living wage laws—for example, whether nearby cities have a living wage.  But some 
features of living wage laws arise only in the context of business assistance laws.  As shown in Table 1, 
these include labor peace provisions, narrow business assistance coverage, and coverage of leaseholders.  
Although not central to the question of understanding the source of differences between estimated effects of 
contractor-only and business assistance living wage laws, these provisions that are unique to business 
assistance laws are of interest in exploring under what conditions business assistance laws have more or 
less impact.  Thus, in our fourth analysis, to estimate the effects of such provisions we estimate versions of 
equation (4) that include interactions between these provisions and LB, but drop LP as it would be perfectly 




Basic Wage and Employment Effects 
  The basic evidence on the effects of living wages on wages and employment is reported in Table 2; 
this replicates some of the findings in Adams and Neumark (forthcoming).  The upper panel reports 
estimates for the subsamples on which we focus—those in the bottom decile of the wage (or predicted 
wage) distribution.  The odd-numbered columns report estimates for a single living wage variable, 
corresponding to equation (1), whereas the even-numbered columns break out separate effects for the 
generally broader living wage laws that extend to employers receiving business assistance and the narrower 
contractor-only living wage laws, corresponding to equation (2).  In the lowest range of the wage 
distribution—at or below the 10
th centile in the MSA-month cell—we find a positive effect; specifically, 
the estimated coefficient on the 12-month lag, 4.01 in column (1), implies an elasticity of about 0.04 but is 
not statistically significant at the 10% level.  However, when we estimate separate effects for business 
assistance and contractor-only living wage laws we find a significant impact of business assistance laws.  
As shown in column (2), the estimated elasticity is 0.07, significant at the 10% level.
26
The employment results are reported in columns (3) and (4).  For living wages generally, in column 
(3), we find an estimated negative net employment effect that is significant at the 5% level.  The estimated 
coefficient of −5.25 implies an elasticity of about −0.12.
27,28  When we estimate separate effects of business 
assistance and contractor-only living wage laws, in column (4), both estimates are negative, but we find a 
significant negative net employment effect only for business assistance living wage laws, and the difference 
in the estimated coefficients is quite pronounced (−7.63 vs. −2.74); the estimate of −7.63 implies an 
elasticity of −0.18.
29  Thus, the basic results reflect the finding that business assistance living wage laws 
boost wages but reduce employment among the lowest skilled.
30  
Because many living wages are above the 10
th centile of the wage distribution but below the 25
th, 
the lower panel of Table 2 reports results for the same wage and employment specifications using those in 
the bottom quartile of the wage or skill distribution, rather than the bottom decile.  The directions of the 
effects are similar to those in the upper panel, but are smaller and not statistically significant; this is what  
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we would expect given that living wages are most likely less binding on this larger set of individuals, 
although in principle the effects could be stronger if those whose wages are affected by living wage laws 
are not the lowest-wage workers.  For more detail on the effects of living wages at different parts of the 
wage or skill distribution, see Neumark and Adams (2003a).   
Effects of Living Wage Laws Based on Other Distinctions  
We next report on alternative specifications of equation (2) where we draw dichotomous 
distinctions between living wage laws based on the presence or absence of other provisions.  It would be 
ideal, and the evidence perhaps more decisive, if we could estimate the effects of all features of living wage 
laws simultaneously.  However, the data—in particular, the relatively small number of cities with specific 
features of living wages laws—preclude this.  Attempts at this simultaneous estimation yielded 
uninformative and very imprecise estimates.   
In this analysis we do not focus on the contractor-only versus business assistance distinction, but 
instead on other “pair-wise” comparisons of features of living wage laws.  Combined with the information 
in Table 1, however, the estimates are useful in thinking about which provisions of living wage laws might 
account for the differences in the estimated effects of contractor-only and business assistance living wage 
laws, which is taken up subsequently.  The results are reported in Table 3.   
Differences between cities whose living wage laws are or are not accompanied by county living 
wage laws are covered in column (1).  The results are ambiguous.  The findings suggest a large and 
significant wage effect in living wage cities with a county law, but not in living wage cities without an 
accompanying county law.  The employment effect, on the other hand, is larger (and statistically 
significant) in the cities without a county living wage law.  Given the ambiguity, it is unlikely the case that 
whether or not a city living wage law is accompanied by a county law is decisive, although we view it as 
notable that the wage effects are larger in places where workers are more likely to be covered because they 
may be subject to either a city or a county ordinance.   
Next, living wage laws are divided up by whether or not there are living wages in nearby cities.  
The results, reported in column (2), suggest that this distinction is important.  Living wage laws coupled  
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with those in nearby cities boost wages, with a positive and statistically significant effect (at the 5% level).  
Similarly, the negative net employment effects appear only for living wage laws that are coupled with those 
in nearby cities, with an employment elasticity of −0.23 and an estimated effect that is significant at the 5% 
level.  Note also that this table marks with an asterisk cases where the effects of the two types of living 
wage laws considered are significantly different from each other at the 5% level; in this case, for both the 
wage and employment effects we find significant differences in living wage effects with regard to whether 
or not a nearby city has a living wage law. 
Columns (3) and (4) turn to whether living wage laws have community hiring provisions or 
provisions that they can be superseded by collective bargaining.  It is not clear, a priori, what effects these 
differences should have.  Community hiring provisions in some form or another encourage hiring in the 
city passing the living wage law, and are intended to encourage contractors (for example) to hire city 
residents.  Conceivably, if living wage laws reduce employment, then in cases where there are community 
hiring provisions the employment impact on the city’s workforce could be mitigated if employment 
reductions are more concentrated among non-residents; of course, since we study MSAs rather than cities, 
any differences might be muted.  Supersession by collective bargaining is sometimes interpreted as simply 
encouraging employers to be more amenable to unionization, although living wage laws per se should 
accomplish this because they make the threat point in union negotiations less attractive to employers.  At 
any rate, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that in both cases, living wage laws with these types of 
provisions tend to have greater positive effects on wages, although the differences are not large relative to 
the standard errors of the estimates.
31  And correspondingly, living wage laws with these provisions have 
stronger negative net employment effects; in this case the differences are marked. 
Column (5) looks at living wage laws distinguished by whether or not the coverage of contractors 
is broad.  All else the same, to the extent that the contractor provisions of living wage laws have an effect, 
we would expect the effect to be greater when broader coverage is specified.  The estimates reflect this in 
the employment effects of living wage laws, but not the wage effects.  While the former result might appear 
consistent with expectations, the ambiguity between the wage and employment results suggests that the  
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evidence of greater negative net employment effects of living wage laws with broader contractor coverage 
should be viewed cautiously. 
Finally, column (6) turns to Luce’s classification of living wage laws in terms of 
enforcement/implementation.  Here, like in column (5), the estimated employment effect is large and 
significant only for those living wage laws with broad enforcement, which is sensible.  With regard to the 
wage effects, the point estimates are larger for these broader living wage laws, although the difference is 
small and not statistically significant.  All in all, though, this evidence is best interpreted as suggesting that 
the living wage laws Luce classifies as having broader enforcement/implementation do have sharper 
effects.
32   
Do Other Features of Living Wage Laws Explain the Stronger Effects of Business Assistance Laws? 
In this sub-section we ask whether other provisions or features of living wage laws can account for 
the stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws compared with contractor-only living wage 
laws.  Of course this is likely to be the case only for provisions or features of these laws that differ across 
business assistance and contractor-only laws, as summarized in Table 1.  Moreover, it is likely to be the 
case for those provisions that appear to be associated with stronger (or weaker) effects of living wage laws.  
With respect to Table 1, we noted earlier that the differences that appear to stand out are that business 
assistance laws are considerably more likely to be in cities for which nearby cities also have living wage 
laws, and in cities with community hiring provisions or with stronger enforcement/implementation.  
Interestingly, the estimates in Table 3 suggested that the wage and employment effects are sharper when 
living wages are accompanied by those in nearby cities or include community hiring provisions, and to 
some extent also when enforcement/implementation is more broad.  But here we turn to more direct 
analysis of this question, and the complete set of results for the different features of living wage laws that 
we consider. 
The first analysis, based on equation (3), is reported in Table 4.  Here we maintain separate 
interactions for contractor-only and business assistance laws, and ask whether the greater wage and 
employment effects associated with business assistance laws can be explained by other provisions or  
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features of living wage laws.  The estimates in column (1) indicate that where county living wage laws 
exist along with city living wage laws, the estimated wage effect of business assistance laws becomes 
weaker and is no longer statistically significant.  But the negative net employment effect becomes stronger 
and remains statistically significant at the 5% level.  Given that county living wage laws do not show up 
more frequently among cities with business assistance provisions, we find it unlikely that county living 
wage ordinances drive the stronger results for business assistance cities.    
In columns (4), (5), and (6), looking at supersession by collective bargaining agreements, broad 
contractor coverage, and broad enforcement/implementation, the estimates continue to indicate strong (if 
anything, stronger) wage and employment effects of business assistance living wage laws.  Thus, these 
differences among living wage laws do not account for the stronger wage effects and negative net 
employment effects of living wage laws that cover business assistance recipients.   
The estimates in columns (2) and (3), for living wage laws in nearby cities and with community 
hiring provisions, present a somewhat different picture.  First, community hiring provisions appear to 
account for the larger employment effects of business assistance living wage laws, as business assistance 
laws without these provisions have essentially no detectable employment effect.  On the other hand, 
though, the wage effect of business assistance laws is not explained by this feature of living wage laws.  
Coupled with the absence of an obvious reason why community hiring provisions should lead to stronger 
employment effects, we do not view this evidence as overturning in a decisive way the findings regarding 
business assistance laws.   
In contrast, whether or not nearby cities have living wage laws appears to account more 
successfully for the stronger wage and employment effects of business assistance laws.  For both the wage 
and employment effects, the large point estimates (positive for wages, and negative for employment) exist 
for living wage laws coupled with living wages in nearby cities, and not for business assistance living wage 
laws in the absence of living wages in nearby cities.  These findings, combined with the expectation that 
living wage laws are likely to have stronger effects when they also exist in nearby labor markets, suggest  
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that geographic concentration of living wage laws may in fact be more significant than the distinction 
between business assistance and contractor-only living wage laws.   
On the other hand, this inference is fragile.  Note from Table 1 that many of the cities that have 
business assistance living wage laws and do not have a living wage in a nearby city are quite small (e.g., 
Madison and Toledo).  Thus, identification of the separate effects of business assistance provisions and 
living wages in nearby cities comes from a relatively small number of observations.  Reflecting this, when 
we eliminate the three cities with laws that have business assistance provisions but no contractor coverage 
(Minneapolis, Duluth, and San Antonio), living wages in nearby cities no longer matter, and in fact the 
differences associated with business assistance living wage laws (irrespective of living wages in nearby 
cities) re-emerges.  The combined evidence therefore suggests that we cannot decisively determine whether 
or not it is the geographic concentration of living wage laws or business assistance coverage that is 
decisive, but it raises the possibility that business assistance provisions are not as central as some of our 
earlier work has suggested.  And the fragility of the findings with respect to this question points to the need 
to revisit this question as more data on living wages become available in the future.  
Table 5 takes this analysis one step further, reporting estimates of equation (4), which permits the 
differences associated with business assistance versus contractor-only living wages to differ depending on 
whether there is a living wage in a nearby city.  We only look at the question of living wages in nearby 
cities, given that the results just discussed seem to suggest that this is the one feature that may account for 
the stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws.  The motivation for this is to see whether the 
stronger effects for living wages coupled with those in nearby cities holds across both types of living wage 
laws, or whether instead it is simply business assistance living wage laws coupled with laws in nearby 
cities that have stronger effects, which would leave more of an independent role for the business assistance 
provisions, although the results would still suggest that that, on average, business assistance provisions of 
living wage laws do not account for their stronger effects.  The evidence regarding wage effects is 
consistent with the second scenario, as it is only the combination of business assistance living wage 
coverage plus living wages in nearby cities that yields a positive wage effect.
33  On the other hand, for the  
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employment effects the evidence indicates that significant employment declines are associated with living 
wage laws accompanied by living wages in nearby cities, regardless of whether the living wage law covers 
contractors only or also extends to business assistance.  Thus, this analysis, which is more taxing on the 
data, provides mixed evidence on whether it is the business assistance provisions of living wage laws or the 
presence of living wages in nearby cities that strengthens the effects of living wage laws.  But clearly the 
geographic concentration of living wage laws is an important part of the story, and this latter distinction 
among living wage laws may be more significant than the contractor-only/business assistance distinction. 
Features of Business Assistance Living Wage Laws 
Finally, we explore some features of living wage laws that are unique to laws with business 
assistance provisions, either by coincidence or construction.  In particular, we ask how the effects of 
business assistance living wage laws vary depending on whether they are accompanied by labor peace 
provisions (which happen to occur only in the context of business assistance living wage laws), whether the 
assistance coverage is narrow, and whether leaseholders are covered (the latter two are only defined for 
business assistance laws).   
If the preceding results had indicated that other features of living wage laws fully explained our 
earlier findings regarding the stronger effects of business assistance living wage laws, then there would be 
little if any motivation for this analysis.  In fact, the previous subsection indicated that part of the reason we 
tend to find that business assistance living wage laws have stronger wage and employment effects is 
because these laws also tend to be the ones that are enacted in cities where there are also living wages in 
nearby cities.  But because the evidence was mixed, this final analysis further explores the effects of 
business assistance living wage laws by asking whether features of these laws that should be associated 
with variation in their effects are indeed associated with such variation (in the expected directions); this 
helps both in providing additional evidence on whether the effects of business assistance living wage laws 
that we find are real or spurious, and also in understanding what features of business assistance living wage 
laws might strengthen or weaken their effects.    
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The results are reported in Table 6.  It is not clear what to expect regarding labor peace agreements.  
The point estimates are not very precise, but they suggest that living wage laws coupled with these 
agreements result in larger positive wage effects; the estimated effect of a business assistance law absent a 
labor peace agreement is only 3.00, versus 7.21 (3.00 + 4.21) when there is a labor peace agreement.  In 
contrast, the estimated employment effect if negative and little changed whether or not there is a labor 
peace agreement.   
The results for narrow coverage and leaseholder coverage are partially in accord with expectations.  
The strong positive estimated wage effect of business assistance living wage laws (8.44) is nearly 
completely offset when the coverage is narrow (as the estimated coefficient on the interaction is −7.05).  
The same is true for the employment effect, for which the estimated effect is −8.59 for business assistance 
laws that are not narrow, falling by 5.5 when assistance coverage is narrow.  Similarly, the positive wage 
effect, while imprecise, is larger for business assistance living wage laws that cover leaseholders.  
However, there is no evidence of a correspondingly larger employment effect.  Thus, the evidence is 
mixed, but the weaker effects associated with narrow coverage and the stronger effects (for wages) 
associated with leaseholder coverage are consistent with expectations regarding business assistance 
coverage of living wage laws.  Nonetheless, the earlier evidence regarding the business assistance versus 
the nearby cities distinction indicates that the geographic concentration of living wage laws may be the 
more important feature determining the strength of the effects of living wage laws.  
V. Conclusions
This paper considers a variety of different features of living wage laws—such as the breadth of 
coverage, community hiring provisions, whether leaseholders are covered, and the existence of living 
wages in nearby jurisdictions—and how they influence the strength of the effects of living wages on wages 
and employment of low-wage, low-skill individuals.  This question is of general interest in furthering our 
understanding of living wage laws.  It is also motivated by findings in our past research that living wage 
laws that apply only to city contractors do not have detectable effects on wages or employment of low-skill  
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individuals, but that strong wage and employment effects arise for living wage laws that cover recipients of 
business assistance from the city (almost always in conjunction with coverage of contractors).   
Given the small number of living wage laws with which to try to distinguish the effects of 
alternative features of these laws, the evidence is often not very decisive statistically.  In particular, we are 
unable to simultaneously estimate the effects of the variety of potentially important features of living wage 
laws that we have identified, and recognize that if we could do this our evidence would be stronger.  And in 
the more limited specifications we do estimate, the estimates are sometimes imprecise.  As a result, in our 
opinion this research is better viewed as opening up a number of questions about the influence of different 
features of living wage laws, and beginning to try to shed some light on these questions, rather than as 
providing definitive answers.  With that qualification in mind, though, the analysis does provide some 
intriguing findings.   
First, we suggested in the introduction that the strongest and most substantive alternative 
explanation of our findings regarding the greater strength of business assistance living wage laws is that 
these laws are not fundamentally different, but have arisen in cities where stronger living wage campaigns 
have resulted in stronger living wage laws generally.  We examine this hypothesis relying on Luce’s 
(forthcoming) categorization of the enforcement and implementation of living wage laws in cities that have 
passed them.  Consistent with this alternative hypothesis, living wage laws for which 
enforcement/implementation are more broad exhibit stronger negative net employment effects, and perhaps 
slightly larger wage effects.  On the other hand, these stronger effects associated with broader enforcement 
or implementation do not explain the stronger wage and employment effects of business assistance living 
wage laws.  So while stronger enforcement and implementation matters—which is reassuring from the 
perspective of assessing whether the living wage effects we identify are real or spurious—the greater 
impact of business assistance living wage laws is not attributable simply to business assistance laws 
coinciding with laws with stronger enforcement or implementation.   
We also considered a number of other features of living wage laws that might help explain when 
living wage laws have more “bite,” and specifically might account for the apparent stronger effects of  
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business assistance living wage laws.  Simply looking at various features of living wage laws and ignoring 
the issue of contractor-only versus business assistance laws, we find that living wage laws with community 
hiring provisions or living wage laws that can be superseded by collective bargaining appear to have 
greater positive effects on wages and more so stronger employment effects.  Living wage laws with broader 
contractor coverage exhibit stronger employment effects, although not stronger wage effects.  Finally, 
living wage laws have stronger wage and employment effects when they are enacted (or raised) in cities for 
which neighboring cities also have living wages.  When the county also has an ordinance, then the wage 
effects (but not the employment effects) are stronger.  For the most part, the differences among the effects 
of different types of living wage laws that we do find are consistent with expectations, although the 
expected differences are not always apparent in the data.    
When we turn to the narrower question of whether some of these differences among living wage 
laws can help explain the difference between the estimated impacts of contractor-only and business 
assistance living wage laws, we find that a considerably higher share of business assistance living wage 
laws are in cities whose neighbors also have living wage laws.  And whether or not nearby cities have 
living wage laws appears to help account for the stronger wage and employment effects of business 
assistance laws, although the inference is fragile.  Thus, living wages in nearby cities may be part of the 
reason why we see stronger effects of living wage laws in cities that cover firms receiving business 
assistance.   
Finally, we look more closely at business assistance living wage laws, and try to assess whether 
they should be viewed as real or spurious by asking whether features of these laws are correlated with the 
strength of their wage or employment effects in the directions we might expect.  The evidence here is 
mixed, with some evidence of stronger effects when coverage is broad and when leaseholders are covered. 
All told, while the evidence does not point unambiguously in one direction, and is not statistically 
overwhelming, it does suggest that variation in the effects of living wage laws could have more to do with 
the concentration of many living wage laws in contiguous or nearby labor markets, rather than with 
coverage of business assistance recipients.  Some may find this source of variation in the strength of living  
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wage effects more palatable, in part because of skepticism about the enforcement and implementation of 
business assistance living wage laws, and in part because the mechanism by which “overlapping” living 
wage laws enhance their effect is perhaps more obvious than the mechanism by which business assistance 
provisions enhance their effect.  Regardless of the precise conclusion one draws regarding this point, we 
believe this research points to the potential importance of accounting for variations in living wage laws 
that—aside from the level of the mandated wage floor—influence their effects on wages, employment, and 
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Baltimore           Medium    
Boston       Yes     Broad    Yes  (1999) 
Burlington           Yes  NA     
Chicago           Narrow  Yes 
(1998) 
 
Denver           Narrow    
Durham           Narrow    
Jersey  City           Narrow  Yes 
(1999) 
 
Milwaukee           Narrow  Yes 
(1997) 
 
New Haven        Yes    Yes  Medium    Yes (earliest 
1999) 
Portland Narrow           Narrow  Yes 
(1996) 
 
San Francisco  Broad          Yes  Broad    Yes (many, 
earliest 1998) 






              




Cleveland     Yes  Yes    Medium    
Detroit     Yes  Yes    Narrow    Yes  (many, 
earliest 1999) 
Hartford   Narrow      Yes    Narrow    Yes  (earliest 
1997) 




Madison           Yes  NA  Yes 
(1999) 
 
Oakland  Broad   Yes     Yes  Medium    Yes  (many, 
earliest 1998) 
Rochester            NA    




Toledo     Yes  (narrow)       NA    
Business 
assistance only
              
Duluth      Yes    Yes  Narrow     
Minneapolis       Yes  Yes    Medium    Yes  (1997) 
San Antonio    Narrow    Yes      Medium Yes 
(2001)  
 
aThis table was compiled using information from http://www.epionline.org/livingwage/index.cfm and 
http://www.livingwageresearch.org/, and from Luce (forthcoming).  In columns (2) and (3), the absence of an entry indicates that the 
contractors or assistance coverage was neither particularly narrow nor broad compared to other living wage laws.  In columns (4)-(7), 
(9), and (10) we have included only “yes” entries; blank spaces indicate the absence of the particular feature of living wage laws to 
which the column refers.    
Table 2: The Impact of Living Wage Laws on Wages and Employment, Bottom Decile of Wage 
or Skill Distribution
a
 Wages  Employment 
Bottom decile of wage/skill distribution:  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 



















Sample size  46,374  116,466 
Mean 5.60  43.37 
Bottom quartile of wage/skill distribution:    



















Sample size  104,475  282,265 
Mean 6.88  52.43 
aReported are the estimated effects of the living wage on the log wage (employment) of individuals in the 
bottom decile or quartile of the wage (predicted wage) distribution in the MSA-month cell.  Estimates of 
the effects on employment are from linear probability models.  The specifications correspond to equation 
(1) (columns (1) and (3)) and equation (2) (columns (2) and (4)) in the text, and the corresponding 
coefficient from the specifications are listed in the left-hand column.   Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  All estimates are multiplied by 100.  For an MSA’s data to be included in the sample for a 
particular month, there must be at least 25 observations in that MSA-month cell.  Observations for which 
allocated information is required to construct the dependent variable in the CPS are dropped.  The 
estimations include controls for year, month, MSA, education, age, marital status, race, sex, and the 
minimum wage at the same lag as the living wage variable.  Reported standard errors are robust to non-
independence (and heteroscedasticity) within city cells, following the suggestions in Bertrand, et al. (2002).   
  
Table 3: Wage and Employment Effects of Various Provisions, Bottom Decile of Wage or Skill Distribution
a
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Living wage 12 months ago  
          




























aSee notes to Table 2.  Specifications correspond to equation (2) in the text.  The asterisks denote that the impact of laws with the 
provision/feature is significantly different from the impact of other laws at the 5% level.   
  
Table 4: Wage and Employment Effects of Business Assistance Laws, Controlling for Other Provisions of Laws, 
Bottom Decile of Wage or Skill Distribution
a  
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aSee notes to Table 2.  Specifications correspond to equation (3) in the text.   
 
  
Table 5: The Influence of Living Wages in Nearby Cities on the Effects of Contractor-









Living wage 12 months ago     
























aSee notes to Table 2.  Specifications correspond to equation (4) in the text.  
Table 6: Effects of Features Unique to Business Assistance Laws, Bottom Decile of Wage or Skill 
Distribution
a
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aSee notes to Table 2.  The specification corresponds to equation (4) in the text, but including the LP terms only when 
interacted with LB, given that features of living wage laws unique to business assistance laws are considered.  The 




1 For current information, see www.epionline.org. 
2 The same paper also addresses criticisms of our methods and earlier estimates in Brenner, et al. (2002). 
3 A table with additional details on each living wage law is available from the authors upon request. 
4 In some cases a higher wage is mandated if health insurance coverage is not provided.  We show the lower 
wage, and use it in the estimates reported in this paper; in all of our analyses the results have been insensitive to 
which of the wages we use.  
5 We also looked at exemptions, which exist for non-profits, trainees or youths, small business, etc.  However, 
these are not easily classified into a small number of groups, and hence are not considered in the analysis.   
6 Private communication with Jen Kern, from ACORN’s Living Wage Resource Center (June 2003).  This 
conversation led us to perform the analysis that appears in the final table of the paper, where we examine 
whether particular features of business assistance laws appear to drive the results for this type of law.  
7 The classification of Tucson’s law with respect to community hiring is a bit ambiguous because the law 
specifies a goal of 60 percent city residents only for eligible employees on eligible contracts, which may be quite 
narrow.  Nonetheless, we coded Tucson as having a community hiring provision, but we verified that the results 
were not sensitive to classifying Tucson as not having such a provision. 
8 This information is missing for a few of the smaller cities, in which case they are dropped from the empirical 
analysis reported below. 
9 Column (10) also gives an indication of whether many nearby cities have living wages. 
10 Specifically, for part of 1995, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) codes are unavailable in the ORGs due to 
phasing in of a new CPS sample based on the 1990 Census.   
11 The CPS is a stratified random sample based on sampling units within strata.  However, the sampling units 
made up of the most populous areas (including large- and medium-sized metropolitan areas) are in strata by 
themselves, so that these areas are always sampled, and, by design, sampling units are self-representing.  That is, 
the sampling unit covering an MSA is intended to be representative of the population of that MSA, not that MSA 
plus other sampling units in the strata.  Finally, the households sampled within each sampling unit are chosen to 
be representative of the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the sampling unit.  As a result, we can 
use the CPS to construct representative wage and skill distributions for MSAs.
  In a small number of cases, 
though, outlying counties are excluded from the CPS sampling frame for an MSA, in which case the data are  
 
representative of the remainder of the MSA.  (See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1997). 
12 A related issue regarding the CPS is whether we have enough observations on workers covered by living 
wages to reliably estimate the effects of living wage laws.  See the discussion of this point in Brenner, et al. 
(2002) and Adams and Neumark (forthcoming). 
13 For the estimation of wage effects, we restricted our sample to workers with an hourly wage greater than $1 
and less than or equal to $100.  We also limited the sample to those who were ages 16 to 70.  The latter 
restriction also applied to the employment analysis. 
14 It is appropriate to include these controls in case the workforce in a city shifts over time in such a way as to 
influence wage levels.  However, any such changes are likely to be minor, and the results are robust to the 
exclusion of these controls.  
15 In the few cases of MSAs that straddle states with different minimum wages in some years (Davenport-Quad 
Cities, Iowa; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Portland, Oregon; and Providence, Rhode Island), we used a weighted 
average of the minimum wages in the two states, weighting by the shares of the MSA population in each state 
(averaged over the months of 1996). 
16 Alternatively, we have estimated these specifications using dummy variables for each distinct month-year pair, 
rather than month and year dummy variables separately.  The results were the same. 
17 The idea behind imposing the minimum wage as the floor in the absence of a living wage is that the living 
wage effect is identified from whatever sectors of the workforce or population have their wage affected by a 
living wage law, but in the absence of the living wage the minimum wage would still bind for these sectors.  The 






jst)], where in the 
absence of a living wage w
liv
jst would equal zero, and max[ln(w
liv
jst),0] would therefore equal zero.  Given that 
the minimum wage most likely binds on workers affected by the living wage, this seems like a misspecification.  
Nonetheless, we also estimated the models using this latter specification.  As we would expect, the estimate of γ’ 
was considerably smaller than the estimate of γ, because the scale of variation of the alternative living wage 
variable is much larger, with the bottom of the range extending to zero instead of ln(w
min
jst).  However, the 
results were qualitatively similar in terms of statistical significance and the implied effect of imposing a typical 
living wage.   
18 For key specifications, we re-estimated the effects without lagging the minimum wage, and we found it 
resulted in no appreciable change in the results.  
 
19 Among the MSAs with a living wage effective in a particular month, the living wage was below the 10
th 
centile in 18% of the cases, and between the 10
th and 25
th centiles in 65% of the cases.  We also report results for 
our basic specifications conditioning on wage or predicted wages lying below the 25
th centile, rather than the 
10
th.  
20 Our work has been subjected over time to alternative analyses and specification checks.  For example, when an 
unconditional quantile regression is estimated, which measures the effects of living wages on those whose wages 
are low in an absolute sense, effects similar to those we find using equation (1) are obtained.  The same is true if 
we simply estimate equation (1) for the 10
th centile.  In addition, to address the possibility that living wages are 
passed concurrently with other policies at the state level that may impact wages positively (or employment 
negatively), we have used within-state control groups (rather than all other urban workers), which resulted in 
similar estimates (Neumark and Adams, 2003a).  Finally, one of us has attempted to perform an event analysis, 
where we examine trends before and after the passage of laws (Neumark, 2002).  The results were less 
informative but supported the general findings. 
21 We do this in a simple manner, estimating a standard log wage regression with year and month controls and 
using predicted log wages from the estimated regression to construct imputed wage distributions for the MSA-
month cell.  Of course, the market wages faced by those who choose not to work are likely lower than those 
faced by observationally equivalent individuals who choose to work; this is the standard sample selection 
problem.  We verified that reducing the imputed wages of the non-workers by 5% and 10% leads to results that 
were qualitatively similar.   
   
  
22 The business assistance laws may or may not include contractor provisions as well, although most do (see 
Table 1). 
23 L1 and L2 are a flexible way to denote that we are looking at the effects of laws with and without a given 
feature.  For example, L1 may be laws with business assistance provisions and L2 laws without business 
assistance provisions (contractor-only laws).  Alternatively, L1 might indicate a city with a law that is in a county 
with a separate living wage law; L2 would then indicate a city with a law that is in a county without a separate 
law.  Other features, such as nearby cities, community hiring provisions, etc., are similarly examined. 
24 In principle, the L1 and L2 variables in the max operators should have ‘t’ subscripts, because some 
characteristics of living wage laws—in particular, whether nearby cities or the county in which a city is located 
have living wages—can change over time.  The analyses of living wages in the county or nearby cities are the 
only ones to use variation over time in features of living wage laws.      
 
25 Note that this specification allows for four different effects of living wage laws: business assistance laws with 
the provision and without the provision, and contractor-only laws with and without the provision.  The model 
can be parameterized in alternative ways, but the one in equation (4) is most convenient for asking whether the 
differential effect of business assistance versus contractor-only laws varies with the provision under 
consideration.   
26 The difference-in-differences approach can lead to spurious findings of statistically significant results in the 
presence of positive serial correlation in the errors, the influence of which is exacerbated by the positive serial 
correlation in the measure of the treatment that is typical of difference-in-differences analyses (Bertrand, et al., 
2002).  In all of the regression tables, we report standard errors that allow for arbitrary autocorrelations across 
observations for each city, which should eliminate any downward bias in the estimated standard errors.  This is 
one of the solutions Bertrand, et al., propose to the problem of downward bias in the estimated standard errors in 
difference-in-differences analyses.  In an example they consider, this approach generates accurate standard errors 
and hence inferences as long as there is a large number of groups.  In their example they consider 51 groups 
(corresponding to a state-level analysis) to be large number for which this approach works well; we in fact have 
far more groups, as we study cities rather than states.   
27 This is calculated by dividing the point estimate of –5.25 by the mean employment rate among the lowest 
skilled (43.37%, as reported in Table 2).   
28 Note that in the context of raising a wage floor, especially for a subset of workers, the employment effect 
represents a combination of demand and supply effects, which may include employment reductions among the 
least-skilled from demand reductions, employment increases among the more-skilled from demand increases, 
and supply shifts as, for example, wages and hours of family members change.   
29 If this estimated employment effect is compared with the estimated wage effect, the evidence indicates an 
employment elasticity with respect to the “realized” wage increase of −2.6 ({−7.63/.44}/−6.68), larger than the 
−0.5 figure that is taken as a consensus in the labor demand literature (Hamermesh, 1993).  (Note that this refers 
to the overall labor demand elasticity, not the elasticity of labor demand with respect to minimum wages; the 
latter is necessarily smaller because the minimum wage increases relatively few workers’ wages, and even then 
typically not dollar for dollar.)  This suggests that the estimated negative employment effect, insofar as it arises 
solely due to the “average” wage effect of living wages, is larger than would be expected.  However, living 
wages may entail greater increases in projected future labor costs than the wage increase that identifies the  
 
typical labor demand elasticity, given their frequent indexation.  Also, this elasticity focuses on one narrow 
category of workers, rather than labor overall, so that substitution possibilities may be considerably greater.     
30 This is still true if we exclude those business assistance cities where laws apply only to business assistance 
recipients and not to firms under contract. 
31 One might actually expect weaker effects on wages when living wage laws can be superseded by collective 
bargaining.  The voice mechanism that unions allow, and the flexibility to forego the wage level mandated by the 
living wage law, may result in unions using the leverage provided by living wage laws to push for other benefits 
or conditions of employment rather than higher wages.  Fairris (this issue) presents some other evidence for city 
contractors in Los Angeles suggesting that the positive wage impact of the city’s living wage laws was smaller 
for unionized contractors.    
32 Although laws classified as having narrow enforcement/implementation are more prevalent among contractor-
only laws, if we instead contrasted narrow laws with broad/medium laws the results were more anomalous.   
33 The effect of living wages with these characteristics is 10.71 (17.66 – 5.24 – 1.71), and this estimate has a 
standard error of 4.25.   